The Billion-Rupee Shopping List: Who Is Getting Sri Lanka’s Government Contracts?

Sri Lanka is spending hundreds of billions of rupees through public procurement. New government data show that competition is taking place across many major institutions — but they also reveal pockets of non-competitive awards, repeated extensions, audit findings and a digital procurement reform that has been pushed years beyond its original deadline.

By Lakbima News Investigations
September 2026

Every rupee has a story

There is a moment in every government purchase when public money becomes someone else’s revenue.

A ministry needs something.

A department prepares a specification.

Companies submit offers.

Officials evaluate them.

A contract is awarded.

And the State pays.

On paper, it is routine.

But for Sri Lanka, there is a bigger question hiding inside that routine process:

How much competition is there when the Government spends our money?

The question matters more now than it did before Sri Lanka’s economic crisis.

The country has borrowed heavily. Taxes have risen. Public investment is under pressure. Government expenditure is being watched more closely by Parliament, international lenders, auditors and, increasingly, the public.

And the way the State buys everything from fuel and medical equipment to software, infrastructure and security services can determine whether taxpayers receive value for money — or whether the Government pays more than it needs to.

The International Monetary Fund’s governance diagnostic identified procurement as one of Sri Lanka’s significant governance vulnerabilities. It pointed to weak procurement planning, inadequate competition, unsolicited proposals, poor contract management and limited public access to procurement information. [IMF Governance Diagnostic]

Three years later, the Government has changed some of that.

But not all of it.

And the data now being published allow us to see where the remaining questions are.

Rs.731.9 billion in the first-half data

The Ministry of Finance has begun publishing procurement information under the Government’s governance action plan, including competitiveness details and awarded values.

The latest dataset covers major procuring entities and high-value procurements. It should not be mistaken for the value of all government procurement in Sri Lanka.

But the numbers are still enormous.

Based on the entity-level figures reported in the procurement-monitoring data, the combined awarded value across the ten monitored entities shown below comes to approximately Rs.731.887 billion.

That is not Rs.731.887 billion of proven waste.

It is not Rs.731.887 billion of corruption.

It is the value of the high-value procurement awards recorded in the dataset.

That distinction is essential.

But it also shows the scale of the system we are dealing with.

Where the money is going

Source: Ministry of Finance public procurement monitoring data. Values are shown in the dataset’s reported units and converted here to billions/millions of rupees for readability. The chart represents the monitored dataset, not total Sri Lankan government procurement.

View the Ministry of Finance public procurement data

The first surprise: the system is not universally uncompetitive

A responsible investigation has to begin with an uncomfortable fact for anyone looking for an easy headline.

The Government’s own data do not show that most major contracts are simply being handed out without competition.

Several of the largest procurement categories in the dataset are recorded as competitive.

The Ceylon Petroleum Corporation, for example, recorded 42 awarded procurements in the monitored category, with the reported awarded value classified as competitive.

The Transport, Highways, Ports and Civil Aviation grouping also recorded a large volume of competitive awards.

The Health sector’s recorded awards were competitive in the first-half dataset.

This matters.

Because the evidence does not support a lazy conclusion that “government procurement is corrupt.”

The better question is more precise:

Where does the procurement system work — and where does it begin to lose competition?

The SriLankan Airlines warning sign

This is where the numbers become much more interesting.

SriLankan Airlines recorded ten procurements above the relevant high-value threshold in the first half of 2026.

Seven were awarded.

Three were cancelled.

Of the seven awards, five were classified as competitive.

Two were classified as non-competitive.

The value of those two non-competitive awards was approximately Rs.8.368 billion.

The five competitive awards were worth approximately Rs.9.920 billion.

That means the non-competitive awards represented roughly 45.8% of the value of the awarded high-value procurements recorded for SriLankan Airlines in the dataset.

That does not mean 45.8% was corrupt.

It does not mean the two contracts were improperly awarded.

Non-competitive procurement can be permitted under particular circumstances.

But it does mean that almost half of the value of the airline’s awarded high-value procurement in this dataset did not go through the same competitive route as the remainder.

That is exactly the sort of number an investigative newsroom should follow.

What were the two contracts?

Why was competition not used?

How many suppliers were considered?

Was there only one technically capable supplier?

Was there an emergency?

Was this an extension or continuation of an existing contract?

What was the original estimate?

What was finally paid?

The summary data do not answer all those questions.

That is where the real investigation begins.

Education presents another warning

The Education sector provides another example.

In the first-half dataset, two awards were recorded as competitive, with a combined value of approximately Rs.358 million.

One negotiated award was recorded at approximately Rs.278 million.

That negotiated award represented roughly 43.7% of the value of the awards recorded for the sector in the dataset.

Again, the number is not evidence of wrongdoing by itself.

But it raises a straightforward journalistic question:

Why was the negotiated procurement method used, and what evidence justified it?

Irrigation: one contract, another question

The Irrigation sector provides a smaller but similar signal.

Five competitive awards were recorded at approximately Rs.1.374 billion.

One non-competitive award was recorded at approximately Rs.316 million.

That represents approximately 18.7% of the awarded value in the sector’s first-half dataset.

One contract does not establish a pattern.

Three institutions appearing in the same dataset with substantial non-competitive values, however, give investigators a clear starting point.

The Government already knew procurement was a problem

These findings did not appear from nowhere.

The IMF’s 2023 Governance Diagnostic on Sri Lanka described public procurement as an area with significant governance weaknesses.

It identified problems including:

• weak procurement planning;
• inadequate competition;
• non-use of prescribed procurement procedures;
• unsolicited proposals for major projects;
• poor contract management;
• weak monitoring;
• limited external oversight; and
• limited public access to procurement information.

The IMF also warned that non-competitive procedures, including direct contracting and emergency procurement, created particular corruption vulnerabilities.

It noted that Sri Lanka lacked comprehensive procurement data that would allow the extent of non-competitive procurement to be properly measured.

That is a remarkable point.

The country was trying to manage billions of rupees of public procurement without having a complete national picture of how that procurement was being conducted.

Read the IMF Governance Diagnostic

The e-procurement promise that moved to 2028

One of the most important parts of this story is not a contract.

It is a deadline.

The IMF’s governance reform programme originally envisaged moving public procurement transactions onto an electronic government procurement system by the end of 2025.

That deadline passed.

By 2026, the Government was telling the IMF that the development of the e-procurement system had been delayed and that a full rollout was now expected by December 2028.

The Government said it was working on appointing a new vendor through competitive bidding and would establish a time-bound rollout schedule with that vendor.

Read the IMF 2026 review

This delay matters because electronic procurement is not simply about replacing paper with a website.

A properly functioning digital procurement system can create a much stronger audit trail.

Who submitted a bid?

When was it submitted?

What was the price?

Who won?

Why did the others lose?

Was the contract amended?

Was the delivery delayed?

Was the supplier paid?

Was the contract extended?

Did the same company later receive another contract?

These are the questions journalists need to answer.

But there is an important sign of progress

The story should not ignore the reforms that have actually taken place.

The Ministry of Finance now maintains a public procurement section containing procurement notices, awards, procurement guidelines, standard bidding documents and information relating to defaulting suppliers and contractors.

The Treasury also publishes procurement data under the governance action plan.

That is a meaningful change from the situation described by the IMF in 2023, when it found that public access to comprehensive procurement information was extremely limited.

Visit the Ministry of Finance procurement portal

Transparency is not the same thing as accountability.

But transparency is where accountability begins.

The Auditor General’s warning: sometimes the damage is found afterwards

The Auditor General’s reports provide a second layer to the investigation.

One 2024 audit of the Sri Lanka Army examined the purchase of Oracle 19c software.

The software was valued at Rs.101.14 million.

The Auditor General reported that the national competitive bidding process had not been followed and that quotations had instead been called from registered suppliers.

The audit calculated an overpayment of Rs.26.3 million.

The Army’s response said that future procurements of this nature should follow the national competitive bidding process.

Read the Auditor General’s Sri Lanka Army audit

There is an even more revealing detail in the earlier audit record.

The Auditor General reported that a lower bid of Rs.26.30 million from a registered supplier had been excluded on the grounds that the supplier was unregistered, while the procurement itself was awarded for Rs.101.14 million.

The audit also reported that the software remained inactive more than two years after purchase because required training had not been formally provided.

This illustrates why procurement journalism cannot stop at:

“Who won the tender?”

The next question is:

Did the State actually receive what it paid for?

The security contract that kept being extended

The Auditor General’s 2024 audit of the National Apprentice and Industrial Training Authority contains another example.

The Authority obtained security services from the same company that had provided the service in 2023.

The audit said this was done without competitive bidding and outside the procurement process.

The service agreement was extended three times.

The audit reported that Rs.69.78 million had been paid to the security company during 2024.

The Authority explained that the security services covered its head office, three national institutions, 25 district offices and training centres and that the service had originally been selected through a formal process in 2023.

But the Auditor General recommended that the procurement process be followed and an institution be selected accordingly.

Read the Auditor General’s NAITA audit

The question raised by this case is bigger than one security company:

At what point does a contract extension become a substitute for returning to the market?

The word investigators should watch: “urgent”

Emergency procurement exists for a reason.

A hospital cannot always wait months for essential equipment.

A power plant cannot simply stop operating while officials complete a tender.

A natural disaster can require immediate purchasing.

But urgency can also reduce competition.

The IMF specifically identified emergency and other non-competitive procurement methods as areas of heightened integrity risk.

This does not mean an emergency procurement is suspicious.

It means the circumstances surrounding it deserve documentation.

What was the emergency?

When did officials first become aware of the need?

Could the purchase have been planned earlier?

How many suppliers could have supplied it?

How was the price tested?

Was the same supplier subsequently used again?

Those questions can turn a routine procurement document into an investigative trail.

The unsolicited-proposal problem

There is another route that deserves particular scrutiny: unsolicited proposals.

An unsolicited proposal begins differently from a conventional tender.

Instead of the Government first defining a need and inviting companies to compete, a private company approaches the Government with a proposal.

There are legitimate reasons for such proposals.

But they create an obvious transparency problem.

The company arrives first.

The Government then decides whether to proceed.

The IMF has identified unsolicited proposals for major infrastructure projects as a significant procurement vulnerability because they can reduce competition and transparency.

Its governance diagnostic cited the Gampaha, Attanagalla and Minuwangoda Integrated Water Supply Scheme as an example.

The IMF reported that the Auditor General found the project had been awarded through a non-competitive process at a price 33.4% above the cost estimate, and raised concerns about the selected company’s experience.

Those are findings reported by the IMF from audit material and should not be treated as a criminal conviction.

See the IMF’s discussion of unsolicited proposals and procurement vulnerabilities

When procurement becomes a corruption case

There are also cases where procurement allegations have moved beyond audit observations and into criminal investigations.

In October 2025, CIABOC announced the arrest of former Sri Lanka State Trading (General) Corporation chairman Hussain Ahmed Bahila.

According to CIABOC, he was accused of importing 50 temporary storage units in 2015 without a genuine requirement for the corporation and without following proper procurement procedures.

The Commission alleged that the conduct caused a loss of approximately Rs.99.68 million to the corporation and an equivalent undue benefit to an external party.

CIABOC subsequently announced the arrest of former Prime Ministerial senior adviser Jayampathie Charitha Ratwatte over allegations that he influenced officials to bypass procurement procedures and import the storage units from a company he had introduced.

These are allegations and must be treated as such unless and until established in court.

But the case illustrates how a procurement problem can evolve from an administrative decision into a criminal investigation.

CIABOC: State Trading Corporation procurement case

CIABOC: former senior adviser arrest

The theory: the biggest problem may not be the big tender

There is a theory worth testing.

Large contracts receive attention.

They appear in newspapers.

They are scrutinised by Parliament.

They can attract auditors, opposition politicians and civil-society groups.

But smaller contracts can be less visible.

That raises another investigative question:

Are some procurement requirements being divided, repeatedly extended or repurchased in ways that reduce meaningful competition?

We are not claiming this is systematically happening.

But it is a testable hypothesis.

For example, if one institution repeatedly purchases the same category of goods from the same supplier in separate contracts, the pattern deserves examination.

The key variables would be:

• supplier;
• institution;
• product or service;
• contract value;
• date;
• procurement method;
• number of bidders;
• contract extensions;
• contract variations; and
• beneficial ownership.

That is where a proper procurement database could become much more powerful than individual news reports.

The supplier may be more important than the contract

Imagine looking at government procurement from another direction.

Instead of starting with ministries, start with companies.

Which companies repeatedly win?

Which companies win contracts from several ministries?

Which companies receive repeated extensions?

Which companies appear under different names?

Who are their directors?

Who ultimately owns them?

Do their beneficial owners appear elsewhere in the procurement system?

Do politically exposed persons appear in their ownership or management structures?

Do several supposedly independent companies share directors, addresses, telephone numbers or beneficial owners?

That is potentially a much bigger story than simply reporting individual tender awards.

The IMF’s 2026 review says Sri Lanka is moving toward stronger beneficial ownership disclosure requirements in public procurement and verification of beneficial ownership information through the Registrar of Companies.

That means the Government itself recognises that knowing the real owners behind companies is an important part of procurement transparency.

IMF 2026 review — procurement and beneficial ownership reforms

What the new data can — and cannot — tell us

This distinction is crucial.

A newspaper investigation should use procurement data as the starting point, not as a substitute for evidence.

Four theories emerging from the evidence

1. The problem may be concentrated, not universal

The available data do not suggest that every institution is routinely avoiding competition.

Instead, the more interesting possibility is that procurement vulnerabilities may be concentrated in particular institutions, contract categories or procurement methods.

That means future investigations should focus on patterns rather than national averages.

2. Transparency is improving faster than digital integration

Sri Lanka now publishes considerably more procurement information than the situation described by the IMF in 2023.

But the full e-GP system is not expected until December 2028.

That creates a gap between publishing information and having a fully integrated procurement system capable of allowing the public to systematically analyse the entire procurement chain.

3. The real risk may come after the award

A competitive tender does not automatically guarantee value for money.

The investigation has to continue after the contract is signed.

Was the item delivered?

Was it delivered on time?

Was the specification changed?

Was the contract value increased?

Was the deadline extended?

Was the asset actually used?

Did the supplier receive another contract shortly afterwards?

The contract is not the end of the story. It is the beginning.

4. The supplier network could reveal the deeper pattern

If the same companies repeatedly win contracts from different public institutions, that may reveal patterns invisible in individual procurement notices.

That is why beneficial ownership information could become one of the most valuable tools available to investigative journalists.

The human cost of procurement failure

It is easy to read procurement reports and see only numbers.

Rs.100 million.

Rs.500 million.

Rs.8 billion.

But public procurement eventually reaches ordinary people.

An overpriced medical machine means the State has less money for another machine.

A poorly managed construction contract can mean communities wait longer for a building or road.

A failed software project can mean taxpayers effectively pay twice — once for the system that failed and again for its replacement.

An unnecessary purchase consumes money that could have been used elsewhere.

And when government spending becomes inefficient, the consequences do not remain inside a ministry office.

They can eventually appear in taxes, borrowing requirements, public services and the quality of infrastructure people use every day.

That is why procurement is not a technical subject reserved for accountants.

It is a public-interest story.

The next investigation should follow the money

The Government’s public data have given journalists something valuable:

A map.

The next step is to go underneath that map.

For every major contract, investigators should try to reconstruct five stages:

Need: Why did the Government need to buy it?

Tender: How many companies competed?

Winner: Why did this company win?

Ownership: Who ultimately owns or controls the company?

Outcome: Was the contract completed and did the public receive what it paid for?

That is the investigation Lakbima should now pursue.

The question Sri Lanka should be asking

Sri Lanka has spent years talking about corruption.

It has strengthened anti-corruption institutions.

It has re-established the National Procurement Commission.

It has begun publishing procurement information.

It has committed to beneficial ownership disclosure.

It is working toward a new public procurement law.

It is rebuilding its electronic procurement system.

These are significant steps.

But there is still one basic question.

When the Government spends Rs.1 billion, Rs.5 billion or Rs.10 billion of public money, can an ordinary citizen follow that rupee from the moment the Government decides to buy something until the moment the supplier is paid?

If the answer is still no, transparency is not yet complete.

And that may be the real story.

Because procurement corruption does not necessarily begin with a suitcase of cash.

Sometimes it begins much earlier.

With the specification.

With the decision to invite one supplier instead of ten.

With an “urgent” purchase.

With an unsolicited proposal.

With a contract extension.

With a tender that attracts only one serious bidder.

Or with a company that keeps returning through different doors.

The Government has opened more of those doors to public view.

Now journalists need to walk through them.

The next question is no longer simply how much Sri Lanka spends.

It is who gets the money — and why.

What Lakbima will be watching next

This investigation identifies three particularly important areas for deeper document-level reporting:

1. SriLankan Airlines: the approximately Rs.8.368 billion in non-competitive awards recorded in the first-half dataset.
2. Education: the approximately Rs.278 million negotiated award and the justification for that procurement method.
3. Irrigation: the approximately Rs.316 million non-competitive award and the circumstances surrounding it.

The next phase should examine the individual tender documents, bidders, evaluation reports, contract terms, amendments, payments, supplier ownership and final delivery.

Only then can a procurement anomaly become a properly evidenced investigative finding.

Sources and reference documents

1. Ministry of Finance — Public Procurement Data
Public Procurement Data — Ministry of Finance

2. Ministry of Finance — Procurement Portal
Procurement notices, awards, guidelines and supplier information

3. IMF — Sri Lanka Governance Diagnostic Assessment
IMF Governance Diagnostic — Public Procurement

4. IMF — Fifth and Sixth Reviews, 2026
IMF 2026 Sri Lanka Review — Procurement, e-GP and Beneficial Ownership

5. Auditor General — Sri Lanka Army 2024
Auditor General’s Report — Sri Lanka Army

6. Auditor General — National Apprentice and Industrial Training Authority 2024
Auditor General’s Report — NAITA

7. CIABOC — Sri Lanka State Trading Corporation procurement case
CIABOC — Former Chairman arrested over procurement allegations

8. CIABOC — Former Senior Adviser case
CIABOC — Former Senior Adviser arrested over procurement allegations